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Biao He, Xiangyun Zhou, and Thushara D. Abhayapala
Abstract—Physical layer security is an emerging technique to
improve the wireless communication security, which is widely
regarded as a complement to cryptographic technologies. To
design physical layer security techniques under practical scenar-
ios, the uncertainty and imperfections in the channel knowledge
need to be taken into consideration. This paper provides a
survey of recent research and development in physical layer
security considering the imperfect channel state information
(CSI) at communication nodes. We first present an overview
of the main information-theoretic measures of the secrecy per-
formance with imperfect CSI. Then, we describe several signal
processing enhancements in secure transmission designs, such
as secure on-off transmission, beamforming with artificial noise,
and secure communication assisted by relay nodes or in cognitive
radio systems. The recent studies of physical layer security in
large-scale decentralized wireless networks are also summarized.
Finally, the open problems for the on-going and future research
are discussed.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, fading channels, channel
uncertainty, imperfect channel state information.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure communication over wireless fading channels be-
comes a critical issue due to the broadcast nature of wireless
networks. Traditionally, key-based cryptographic technolo-
gies [1] are used to secure the data transmission. However,
the secrecy provided by cryptographic technologies is con-
ditioned on the premise that the eavesdroppers have limited
computational capability to decipher the message without the
knowledge of secret keys. This premise becomes controversial
with the rapid developments of computing devices. On the
other hand, physical layer security is an emerging research area
that explores the possibility of achieving perfect-secrecy data
transmission among legitimate network nodes, while possible
malicious nodes eavesdropping the communication obtain zero
information [2]. Basically, the objective of physical layer
security is to minimize the amount of confidential information
that can be obtained by the illegitimate users according to
their received signals. To achieve secure communications
over wireless channels, physical layer security explores time-
varying properties of the fading channel, smartly designs the
channel code, and processes the transmitted signals, instead of
relying on encryption.
The information-theoretic foundation of secret communi-
cation was laid by Shannon in [3]. Wyner’s pioneering work
introduced the wiretap channel model as a basic framework for
physical layer security [4], which was extended to broadcast
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channels with confidential messages described by Csiszar and
Korner in [5]. These early works have led to a significant
amount of recent research activities taking the fading charac-
teristics of wireless channels into account. The basic system
model of physical layer security over wireless channels is
shown in Fig. 1. Most works in this area rely on the perfect
knowledge of both the legitimate receiver’s and eavesdrop-
per’s channels at the transmitter to enable secure encoding
and advanced signaling. However, the assumption of perfect
knowing channel state information (CSI) is not realistic. In
practical scenarios, many reasons can cause imperfections in
the CSI at the communication nodes, such as the following
ones:
• No feedback from the eavesdroppers. When the eaves-
dropper is a passive entity, its CSI or even location is
very hard to be obtained at the legitimate transmitter.
Also, when the eavesdroppers are malicious users, they
are not willing to provide their channel information to
the legitimate party.
• Partial CSI feedback from the receivers. The receivers
sometimes can only provide partial CSI feedback to the
transmitter, e.g., limited-rate feedback, channel direction
feedback, and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) feedback.
• Imperfect feedback links between the transmitter and
receivers. When the feedback links are not error-free or
delayless, noise component is added into the feedback
information, or the CSI obtained at the transmitter is an
outdated version of the actual CSI.
• Channel estimation errors at the receivers. Since the
estimation of fading channels generally is not error-free,
the CSI obtained at the receivers is not perfect.
Fig. 1. Basic system model of physical layer security over wireless channels.
2Over the past few years, increasing attention has been paid to
the impact of the uncertainty in the CSI on both legitimate
receiver’s and eavesdropper’s channels. The remainder of this
paper is devoted to surveying and reviewing the literature of
physical layer security with imperfect CSI1 in wireless com-
munications. We aim to provide a high-level overview of the
current research and development of the field. In addition, this
survey focus on the physical layer security researches without
using the secret key, despite that some physical layer security
work, e.g., [6–10], investigated the secure transmission with
the key observable by the eavesdropper over wireless channels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. For
research from the information theoretic perspective, Section II
presents the main performance metrics of secure transmissions
with imperfect CSI. Signal processing secrecy enhancements
developed in the secure transmission design considering im-
perfect CSI are reviewed in Section III. Section IV turns to the
secrecy with channel uncertainty in large-scale decentralized
wireless. The open problem and possible future research
directions are described in Section V. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE PERFORMANCE LIMITS
The performance limits of secure transmission systems with
full CSI are often characterized by the secrecy capacity.
The secrecy capacity, Cs, for degraded wiretap channel with
additive Gaussian noise was given by [11],
CS = CM − CE , (1)
where CM and CE denote the Shannon capacities of main (le-
gitimate receiver’s) and eavesdropper’s channels, respectively.
A positive secrecy capacity can be obtained only when the
legitimate receiver’s channel is better than the eavesdropper’s
channel. When considering fading channels, main and eaves-
dropper’s channels for a specific fading realization can be
regarded as complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels. The Shannon capacities of one realization of the
quasi-static fading channels are given by
CM = log2(1 + γM ), (2)
CE = log2(1 + γE), (3)
where γM and γE are the instantaneous SNRs at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. The instantaneous
SNR at the legitimate receiver is equal to γM = P |hM |2/σ2M ,
where P denotes the transmit power, hM denotes the in-
stantaneous channel gain at the legitimate receiver, and σ2M
denotes the receiver noise variance at the legitimate receiver.
Also, the instantaneous SNR at the eavesdropper is equal
to γE = P |hE |2/σ2E , where hE denotes the instantaneous
channel gain at the eavesdropper and σ2E denotes the receiver
noise variance at the eavesdropper. Thus, the secrecy capacity
1Note that the work considering systems with imperfect instantaneous CSI
often covers the case of system with no instantaneous CSI, since imperfect
instantaneous CSI with very large uncertainty naturally converts to the case
of no instantaneous CSI.
for one realization of the quasi-static fading channels can be
written as
CS =
{
log2(1 + γM )− log2(1 + γE), if γM > γE ,
0, otherwise.
(4)
Note that in order to achieve the secrecy capacity in Eq. (4),
the transmitter needs perfect knowledge of both γM and γE .
To measure the performance of secure transmissions over
fading channels with imperfect CSI, ergodic secrecy capacity
and outage-based characterizations are often adopted. In what
follows, focusing on these two kinds of characterizations, we
provide a review on the information theoretic aspect of the
research in the field of physical layer security with imperfect
CSI. In addition, a brief description of the secrecy degrees
of freedom, which applies for systems with pessimistic and
strong CSI assumptions, is presented as well.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Capacity
Ergodic secrecy capacity applies for delay tolerant systems
where the encoded messages are assumed to span sufficient
channel realizations to capture the ergodic features of the
channel. It captures the capacity limit under the constraint of
perfect secrecy. Typical examples of delay tolerant applications
are document transmission and e-mail, which belong to the
non-real time data traffic.
Gopala et al. [12] presented ergodic secrecy capacity for
both full CSI case and the case of only main channel CSI
available at the transmitter. The secrecy capacity for one
realization of the quasi-static fading channels is given in
Eq. (4). Averaging over all fading realizations, the ergodic
secrecy capacity of fading channels with full CSI is given by
C¯
(F )
S =
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
γE
(log2(1+γM)−log2(1+γE))f(γM)f(γE)dγMdγE
(5)
where f(γM ) and f(γE) are the distribution functions of γM
and γE , respectively. Since the transmitter has full CSI on both
channels, the transmitter can make sure that the transmission
occurs only when γM > γE . When only the channel gain of
the legitimate receiver is known at the transmitter, the ergodic
secrecy capacity is given by
C¯
(M)
S =
∫
∞
0
∫
∞
0
[log2(1+γM)−log2(1+γE)]
+
f(γM)f(γE)dγMdγE
(6)
in which [x]+ = max{x, 0}. They outlined a variable-rate
transmission scheme to show the achievability of ergodic
secrecy capacity with only main channel information. During
a coherence interval with the received SNR at the legit-
imate receiver γM , the transmitter transmits codewords at
rate log2(1 + γM ). This variable-rate scheme relies on the
assumption of large coherence intervals and ensures that when
γM < γE , the mutual information between the source and
the eavesdropper is upper-bounded by log2(1 + γM ). When
γM ≥ γE , this mutual information is equal to log2(1 + γE).
Averaging over all the fading states, the achievable perfect
secrecy rate is given by Eq. (6). The secure message is hidden
across different fading states.
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Fig. 2. Ergodic secrecy capacity versus average power constraint. The average
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}
= 1.
Fig. 2 compares the ergodic secrecy capacity of the network
with full CSI at the transmitter and the ergodic secrecy
capacity of the network with only main channel CSI at the
transmitter. The average channel qualities are E
{
|hM |
2
}
=
E
{
|hE |
2
}
= 1, where E{·} is the expectation operation. The
average power constraint is denoted by P¯ = E{P}. According
to Eq. (5), the transmission occurs only when |hM |2 > |hE |2.
Thus, the constant power level used for transmission with full
CSI at the transmitter is P = P¯ /Pr(|hM |2 > |hE |2), where
Pr(·) denotes the probability measure. Note that P = 0 for
|hM |
2 ≤ |hE |
2
, and hence E{P} = P¯ . On the other hand,
the constant power level used for transmission with only main
channel CSI at the transmitter is P = P¯ .
In addition, Khisti and Wornell studied the ergodic se-
crecy capacity for multiple-input, single-output, multiple-
eavesdropper (MISOME) systems in [13]. They developed
upper and lower bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity with
perfect CSI on legitimate receiver’s channel and imperfect
CSI on eavesdropper’s channel. They also investigated the
ergodic secrecy capacity of fasting fading channel for both
high SNR and finitely many antennas, i.e, the number of
transmitted antenna is very large. Rezki et al. [14, 15] studied
the ergodic secrecy capacity for systems with imperfect CSI on
both legitimate receiver’s and eavesdropper’s channels at the
transmitter. In [14], they presented a framework that charac-
terizes the ergodic secrecy capacity of fast fading channels
under imperfect legitimate receiver’s channel estimation at
the transmitter. In [15], they established upper and lower
bounds on the ergodic secrecy capacity for single-input, single-
output, single-eavesdropper (SISOSE) system with limited-rate
feedback of the legitimate receiver’s channel information.
B. Outage-Based Characterizations
As mentioned before, the ergodic secrecy capacity applies
for delay tolerant systems which allow for the adoption of an
ergodic version of fading channels. However, perfect secrecy
cannot always be achieved for systems with stringent delay
constraints, and ergodic secrecy capacity is inappropriate to
characterize the performance limits for such systems. On the
other hand, outage-based characterizations, which measure
systems with probabilistic formulations, become more appro-
priate.
In [16], assuming the fading is quasi-static, Parada and
Blahut analyzed the scenario where the CSI of both legitimate
receiver’s and eavesdropper’s channels is not available at
the transmitter. They provided an alternative definition of
outage probability, wherein secure communications can be
guaranteed for the fraction of time when legitimate receiver’s
channel is stronger than eavesdropper’s channel. Barros and
Rodrigues [17] firstly provided a detailed characterization of
the outage secrecy capacity where the outage probability,
pout, is characterized by the probability that a given target
rate, RS , is greater than the difference between instantaneous
main channel capacity, CM , and instantaneous eavesdropper’s
channel capacity, CE . The expression of pout is given by
pout = Pr (CM − CE < RS) . (7)
They also showed that fading alone guarantees that physical
layer security is achievable, even when the eavesdropper has
a better average SNR than the legitimate receiver. In addition,
Bloch et al. characterized the relationship between the upper
bound of outage probability and the variance of the channel
estimation error on eavesdropper’s channel in [2]. The secrecy
outage behavior of a multiple-input, single-output, single-
eavesdropper (MISOSE) fading system is studied in [18],
where the authors proposed a relation between the degree of
channel knowledge and the tolerable secrecy outage probabil-
ity.
In [2, 16–18], the outage-based formulations capture the
probability of having a reliable and secure transmission. Relia-
bility and security are not distinguished, since an outage occurs
whenever the transmission is either unreliable or not perfectly
secure. In [19], Zhou et al. presented an alternative secrecy
outage formulation which directly measures the probability
that a transmitted message fails to achieve perfect secrecy.
The alternative secrecy outage is formulated by
pso=Pr (CE>RM −RS |message transmission) , (8)
where RM and RS are the rate of transmitted codeword and
the rate of the confidential information in the wire-tap code,
respectively, and the outage probability is conditioned on a
message actually being transmitted. From Eq. (8), we see that
the new formulation takes into account the system design
parameters, such as the rate of transmitted codewords and
the condition under which message transmissions take place.
Therefore, the alternative secrecy outage formulation is useful
for the system designer to design transmission schemes that
meet target security requirements.
Fig. 3 compares the secrecy outage probability of not having
a reliable and secure transmission, pout in Eq. (7), and the
secrecy outage probability of not having a secure transmission,
pso in Eq. (8). The average received SNRs are E{γM} =
E{γE} = 1. The detailed discussion on the comparison of
these secrecy outage probabilities can be found in [19].
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Fig. 3. Secrecy outage probability versus rate of confidential information.
The average received SNRs are E{γM} = E{γE} = 1.
C. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom
Apart from ergodic secrecy capacity and outage-based char-
acterizations, another line of research, e.g., [20–24], studied
the performance limits of systems with imperfect CSI under a
pessimistic but strong assumption that allows the eavesdrop-
per’s channel to be arbitrarily varying. These work analyzed
the so-called secrecy degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f), which is
the pre-log of the secrecy capacity at high SNR and captures
the asymptotic behavior of the achievable secrecy rate in high
SNR regime. The s.d.o.f. is formulated as
s.d.o.f. = lim
P¯→∞
sup
RS
log2
(
P¯
) , (9)
where P¯ denotes the average power constraint on transmitted
signals.
The s.d.o.f region for single-user Gaussian multi-input,
multi-output (MIMO) wiretap channel was investigated
in [20]. The s.d.o.f. region of two user Gaussian MIMO
broadcast channel with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper
channel was found in [21]. The s.d.o.f. region for two user
Gaussian MIMO multiple access channel and Gaussian two-
way channel with the eavesdropper channel being arbitrarily
varying were given in [22] and [23], respectively. The work
of [24] studied s.d.o.f. region for two-user MIMO interference
channel with an external eavesdropper. In addition, there is a
main limitation of this type of works. It always requires some
advantage in the antenna numbers on the legitimate receiver
over the eavesdropper to get positive s.d.o.f..
III. SIGNAL PROCESSING SECRECY ENHANCEMENTS
In this section, we present various signal processing tech-
niques for enhancing secrecy of wireless communications.
Specifically, secure on-off transmissions for signal-antenna
channels, beamforming with artificial noise for multi-antenna
channels, and secure design techniques for relay channel and
cognitive radio systems are described in the following three
subsections.
A. Secure On-off Transmissions for Single-Antenna Channels
Secure on-off transmission policy in wireless network de-
signs generally works in the following way. The transmitter
decides whether or not to transmit according to the knowledge
of CSI on the legitimate receiver’s channel or eavesdropper’s
channel or both channels (if applicable). Transmissions take
place whenever the estimated instantaneous CSI fulfills the
requirements related to some given thresholds, e.g., SNR
thresholds. Otherwise, transmissions are suspended.
Gopala et al. [12] proposed a low-complexity on-off power
allocation strategy according to the instantaneous CSI on the
legitimate receiver’s channel, which approaches the optimal
performance for asymptotically large average SNR. Zhou et
al. [19] designed two on-off transmission schemes, each of
which guarantees a certain level of security whilst maximizing
the throughput. With the statistics of eavesdropper’s channel
information, the first scheme requires CSI feedback from the
legitimate receiver to the transmitter, and the second scheme
requires only 1-bit feedback. In [14], Rezki et al. studied the
system with imperfect legitimate receiver’s CSI and statistics
of eavesdropper’s channel at the transmitter. They derived
the achievable rate of fast fading channel with a simple
on-off scheme using a Gaussian input. In addition, under
various assumptions on the CSI, He and Zhou [25] proposed
several secure on-off transmission schemes, which maximize
the throughput subject to a constraint on secrecy outage
probability. Both fixed-rate and variable-rate transmissions
were proposed. Also, they not only considered the imperfect
CSI at the transmitter, but also studied the impact of imperfect
CSI at the receiver side.
B. Beamforming with Artificial Noise for Multi-Antenna
Channels
The work by Hero [26] is arguably the first to consider
secret communication in a multi-antenna transmission system,
and sparked significant efforts to this problem [27]. For
multi-antenna channels with imperfect CSI, beamforming with
artificial noise is the one of the most widely-used techniques
to secure the data transmission. Negi and Goel [28, 29] first
proposed an artificial noise injection strategy. In addition to
transmit information signals, part of the transmission power is
allocated to generate artificial noise in order to confuse the
eavesdropper. Specifically, the produced artificial noise lies
in the null space of the legitimate receiver’s channel, while
the information signal is transmitted in the range space of
the legitimate receiver’s channel. This technique relies on the
instantaneous CSI on legitimate receiver’s channel, but does
not require the instantaneous CSI on eavesdropper’s channel.
The legitimate receiver’s channel nulls out the artificial noise.
Thus the legitimate receiver is not affected by the noise. The
basic idea of beamforming with artificial noise is presented in
Fig. 4.
In the following, we illustrate the work after Negi and
Goel’s research, which studied the beamforming with artificial
noise in various multi-antenna channel scenarios with different
assumptions on the availability of CSI. We first present the
literature considering imperfect CSI on the eavesdropper’s
5Fig. 4. An illustration of beamforming with artificial noise.
channel, and then discuss the work which considers the
imperfect CSI on both eavesdropper’s and legitimate receiver’s
channels.
1) Imperfect CSI on Eavesdropper’s Channel: The work
in [30] studied the optimal power allocation between the
information signal and the artificial noise for systems with both
non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. The authors found
that the equal power allocation is the strategy that achieves
nearly the same secrecy rate as the optimal power allocation
for the non-colluding eavesdropper case and more power
should be used to transmit the artificial noise as the number
of eavesdropper increases for the colluding eavesdropper case.
In [31], Zhang et al. investigated the design of artificial-noise-
aided secure multi-antenna transmission in slow fading chan-
nels. They provided throughput-maximizing design solutions
with either fixed-rate or adaptive-rate encoder, both including
the optimal rate parameters of the wiretap code as well as the
wise transmit power allocation between the information signal
and the artificial noise. Huang and Swindlehurst [32] obtained
the robust transmit covariance matrices on worst-case secrecy
rate maximization under both individual and global power
constraints. They investigated both cases of direct transmission
and cooperative jamming with a helper. In addition, Gerbracht
et al. [18] characterized the optimal single-stream beamform-
ing with the use of artificial noise to minimize the outage
probability. They pointed out that the solution converges to
maximum ratio transmission (MRT) for the case of no CSI
to the eavesdropper, and the optimal beamforming vector
converges to the generalized eigenvector solution with the
growing level of CSI. Lin et al. [33] showed that the artificial
noise selected in [29] is suboptimal. According to their study,
the eigenvectors of the optimal covariance matrices of both
information signals and generalized artificial noise are equal to
the right singular vectors of the legitimate receiver’s channel,
and the power of artificial noise should be allocated uniformly
over the eigenvectors. The rigorous proofs for these facts were
also provided.
In the work of [18, 29–33], although the instantaneous CSI
on the eavesdropper’s channel is not required, the transmitter
still needs the statistics of eavesdropper’s channel. For the
case where no CSI on the eavesdropper’s channel (including
the statistics) is known at the transmitter, Swindlehurst and
Mukherjee [34, 35] proposed a modified water-filling algo-
rithm which balances the required transmit power with the
number of spatial dimensions available for jamming the eaves-
dropper. As described in the modified water-filling algorithm,
the transmitter first allocates enough power to meet a target
performance criterion, e.g., SNR or rate, at the receiver, and
then use the remaining power for broadcasting artificial noise.
They also applied the similar algorithm to investigate the
multiuser downlink channels in [36].
2) Imperfect CSI on both Eavesdropper’s and Legitimate
Receiver’s Channels: The imperfect CSI on the legitimate
receiver’s channel at the transmitter mainly incurs two prob-
lems. First, without knowing the actual instantaneous CSI
on the legitimate receiver’s channel, the transmitter cannot
make sure that the data transmission rate is not larger than
the legitimate receiver’s channel capacity. Then, a transmitted
packet is unable to be decoded by the receiver, i.e., the packet
is corrupted, whenever the data transmission rate exceeds the
legitimate receiver’s channel capacity. Second, with imperfect
instantaneous CSI on the legitimate receiver’s channel, the
artificial noise leaks into the legitimate receiver’s channel,
since the beamforming with artificial noise is designed accord-
ing to the estimated instantaneous CSI rather than the actual
instantaneous CSI. Therefore, the artificial noise interferes the
desired user, despite that it is intended to only confuse the
eavesdropper. Naturally, the techniques applying for systems
with perfect CSI on the legitimate receiver’s channel become
not optimal.
Taylor et al. presented the impact of the legitimate receiver’s
channel estimation error on the performance of an eigenvector-
based jamming technique in [37]. Their research showed that
the ergodic secrecy rate provided by the jamming technique
decreases rapidly as the channel estimation error increases.
Mukherjee and Swindlehurst [38] also pointed out that the
security provided by beamforming approaches is quite sen-
sitive to the imprecise channel estimates. They proposed a
robust beamforming scheme for MIMO secure transmission
systems with imperfect CSI of the legitimate receiver. Pei et
al. [39] addressed a stochastic time-varying CSI uncertainty
model with uplink-downlink reciprocity. Using this model,
they proposed a new iterative algorithm to secure the trans-
mission, which is robust to CSI errors. The authors of [30]
investigated the effects of imperfect CSI on the optimal power
allocation and the critical SNR for secure communications.
They found that allocating power on the artificial noise to
confuse the eavesdropper is better than increasing the signal
strength for the legitimate receiver as the channel estimation
error increases. Adapting the secrecy beamforming scheme,
Liu et al. [40] investigated the joint design of training and data
transmission signals for wiretap channels. The ergodic secrecy
rate for systems with imperfect channel estimations at both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper was derived. The se-
crecy rate is hard to be calculated, since the channel estimation
6errors cause non-Gaussianity of equivalent noise. They solved
this problem by the large number of transmit-antenna analysis.
Based on the achievable ergodic secrecy rate, they found the
optimal tradeoff between the power used for training and data
signals. Furthermore, advocating the joint optimization of the
transmit weights and artificial noise spatial distribution with
the use of a quality-of-service (QoS)-based perspective, Liao
et al. [41] proposed a secret-transmit beamforming approach
in accordance with the imperfect CSI on both the legitimate
receiver’s and eavesdropper’s channels. In [42], Ng et al.
addressed a resource-allocation and scheduling optimization
problem for orthogonal frequency division multiple access
(OFDMA) networks. The optimization problem takes into
account artificial noise generation and the effects of imperfect
CSI in slow fading. They proposed a resource allocation
algorithm considering secrecy outage, channel outage, and
the potentially detrimental effect of artificial noise generation.
Considering the systems with partial CSI feedback, Lin et al.
investigated the scenario where only quantized channel direc-
tion information (CDI) of the legitimate receiver’s channel is
available at the transmitter in [43]. For a given transmission
power and a fixed number of feedback bits, they derived the
optimal power allocation among the information signal and
the artificial noise to maximize the secrecy rate under artificial
noise leakage.
In addition, it is necessary to mention that there also exist
some studies not considering the artificial noise to enhance the
security of multi-antenna systems with imperfect CSI. Some
examples, i.e., [33, 44–46], of these studies are illustrated
as follows. In [44], Li and Petropulu solved optimal input
covariance that maximizes the ergodic secrecy rate subject
to a power constraint for MISOSE systems with imperfect
CSI on eavesdropper’s channel. Li and Ma [45] formulated
a transmit-covariance optimization problem for secrecy-rate
maximization (SRM) of MISOME systems with imperfect CSI
on both main and eavesdropper’s channels. The authors of [33]
analyzed the systems with only statistics of main and eaves-
dropper’s channels at the transmitter. They showed that the
secure beamforming is still secrecy capacity achieving in such
a scenario, and proposed the optimal channel input covariance
matrix, which fully characterizes the secrecy capacity. They
also pointed out that the artificial noise is not necessary in
this case. Geraci et al. studied secrecy sum-rates achievable
by regularized channel inversion (RCI) precoding in MISO
systems under imperfect CSI in [46].
C. Secure Designs for Relay Channels and Cognitive Radio
Systems
Secure communication assisted by relay nodes is often
regarded as a natural extension to the secure transmission
in multi-antenna networks. The physical layer security can
be provided by careful signaling at different relays in the
system. A virtual beam towards the legitimate receiver can
be built by the collaboratively work among relay nodes,
which is similar to the secure transmission in multi-antenna
systems. However, unlike the multiple-antenna transmission,
the transmitter cannot directly control the relays. For the
network of single-antenna wiretap channel with serval relays,
Goel and Negi [29] described a 2-phase protocol to obtain
coordination in transmitting artificial noise among the relays.
In the first phase, the transmitter and the legitimate receiver
both transmit independent artificial noise signals to the relays.
Different linear combinations of these two signals are received
by the relays and the eavesdropper. In the second phase,
the relays replay a weighted version of the received signal,
using a publicly available sequence of weights. Meanwhile,
the transmitter transmits the confidential information, along
with a weighted version of the artificial noise transmitted
in the first stage. With the knowledge of the artificial noise
component due to the legitimate receiver, the legitimate re-
ceiver is able to cancel off the artificial noise and get the
confidential information. Assuming global full CSI at every
node, the work in [47] provided a detailed analysis on se-
cure communications of one source-destination pair with the
help of multiple cooperating relays in the presence of one
or more eavesdroppers, which includes decode-and-forward
(DF), amplify-and-forward (AF), and cooperative jamming
(CJ) three different cooperate schemes.
To explore the effects of imperfect CSI in relay systems, re-
searchers often consider the uncertainty of CSI on three kinds
of links, which are relay-destination links, relay-eavesdropper
links, and source-relay links. The authors of [48] investigated
the effect of imperfect CSI on the relay-eavesdropper channels.
They proposed a DF relaying protocols for secure communica-
tion, which maximizes the lower bound on the ergodic secrecy
capacity under a total relay transmission power constraint.
Considering the imperfect CSI on the channels from relay to
destination and relay to eavesdropper, Zhang and Gursoy [49]
provided optimization frameworks for the robust DF-based
relay beamforming design. Furthermore, Vishwakarma and
Chockalingam [50] computed the worst case secrecy rate when
there are imperfections in the CSI on all the links, i.e., relay-
destination links, relay-eavesdropper links, and source-relay
links.
Cognitive Radio (CR) has been widely recognized as an
effective technology to improve the utilization of wireless
spectrum by allowing secondary users to coexist with primary
users and access the spectrum of the prime system. In CR
systems with secrecy message broadcasted in the primary
links, the signals of secondary links for their users can also
serve as the artificial noise for the secure primary link. In
order to confuse the eavesdropper overhearing the primary
links, the secondary system operates similar to that of the
helper nodes, but simultaneously serving their own receivers.
The papers that study the imperfect CSI in such cognitive
radio systems can be found in [51] and references within.
The authors of [51] explored MISO CR systems where the
secondary system secures the primary communication in return
for permission to use the spectrum. On the other hand, when
the secondary user transmitter sends confidential information
to a secondary user receiver on the same frequency band with
a primary user, the requirement of not interfering the primary
users is often treated as a power constraint on the transmitted
signals in the secondary system. Assuming all CSI is imperfect
known, Pei et. al [52] explored the optimal secondary user
7transmitter design, which maximizes the secure transmission
rate of the secondary link while avoiding harmful interference
to the primary users. They proposed two approaches to solve
this challenging optimization problem, which is non-convex
and semi-infinite.
IV. SECRECY IN LARGE-SCALE DECENTRALIZED
WIRELESS NETWORKS
In the last section, we summarized the research results on
physical layer security enhancements for systems consisting
of a small number of nodes. We now turn our attention to
another very important class of wireless networks: large-scale
decentralized wireless networks. In such networks, the CSI of
eavesdroppers is rarely available at legitimate users. Even the
locations of eavesdroppers may not be known. The lack of
eavesdropper’s information makes communication security a
challenging problem. Apart from that, the decentralized nature
of the network rules out any global optimization approach
for secrecy enhancements. Pioneering works on physical layer
security in large-scale decentralized wireless networks focused
on the connectivity analysis. Specifically, the notion of se-
crecy graph was introduced in [53] and further developed
in [54] to include fading channels. Various secure connectivity
improvements were discussed in [55, 56], including multi-
antenna sectoring and beamforming. The connectivity in the
presence of the location uncertainty of eavesdroppers was
studied in [57].
Building up from the connectivity analysis of the secrecy
graph, the secrecy capacity scaling was analyzed in [58–62].
Specifically, the studies in [58, 59] showed that the secrecy re-
quirement does not reduce the capacity scaling of the network,
i.e., the capacity scaling law is the same for both insecure
message transmission and secure message transmission. Of
course, achieving such an optimal scaling law under the
secrecy constraint requires very different transmission and
access protocols. For example, when eavesdroppers’ locations
are unknown, various secrecy enhancements such as coopera-
tive jamming and multi-path transmission in conjunction with
network coding may be required [61, 62].
Although the scaling law results may provide insights into
the asymptotic secrecy throughput performance of large-scale
networks, a finer view of throughput is necessary to better un-
derstand the impact of key system parameters and transmission
protocols, since most of design choices affect the actual (non-
asymptotic) throughput but not the scaling behaviors. To this
end, a new performance metric named secrecy transmission
capacity was developed in [63, 64] to capture the area spectral
efficiency of secure transmission. The formulation of such
a metric was based on the outage approach in [19] which
accommodates the practical scenario where the CSI of the
eavesdroppers is unknown to the legitimate nodes.
V. OPEN PROBLEMS AND DISCUSSIONS
Despite the increasing attention paid to the effect of imper-
fect CSI on the physical layer security, research on this area
is still at an early stage. In this section, we discuss some open
problems in the research area of the physical layer security
with imperfect CSI.
A. Imperfect Channel Estimation at Receivers
Among the existing work on physical layer security con-
sidering imperfect CSI, most investigates the impact of im-
perfect CSI at the transmitter while assuming perfect channel
estimation at the receivers. However, only a limited amount
of work, e.g., [25, 30, 40], paid attention to the imperfect
channel estimation at the receivers. Clearly, the assumption
of perfect channel estimation at the receiver is not very
practical, since the estimation of fading channels generally is
not error-free. In principle, the channel estimation error exists
at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Assuming
perfect estimation at the eavesdropper is more reasonable
from the secure transmission design point of view, since it
is often difficult or impossible for the transmitter to know the
accuracy of the eavesdropper’s channel estimate. Nevertheless,
in scenarios where the eavesdropper is just an ordinary user of
the network whose performance and other information can be
tracked by the transmitter, e.g., [13, 65, 66], the consideration
of imperfect channel estimation at the eavesdropper becomes
relevant.
B. Imperfect Knowledge of Eavesdroppers’ Locations
With few exceptions, almost all the existing research studies
on physical layer security assumed that the eavesdropper’s lo-
cation is perfectly known. The validity of such an assumption
strongly depends on the application under investigation. For
example, when the eavesdropper is a passive entity without
transmission, its location is very hard to be obtained. Also,
in large-scale complex networks, it is very difficult to obtain
eavesdroppers’ locations due to the random deployments or
mobility of nodes. Therefore, it is an interesting research
direction to consider the secrecy in networks with imperfect or
no knowledge of the eavesdropper’s location at the transmitter.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we reviewed the research in physical layer
security with practical assumptions on fading channel infor-
mation. For the characterizations of performance limits, we
described ergodic secrecy capacity suitable for delay toler-
ant systems, outage-based characterizations for systems with
stringent delay constraints, and secrecy degrees of freedom.
Also, we surveyed the signal processing secrecy enhancements
proposed for different transmission scenarios, i.e., secure on-
off transmission for signal-antenna channels, beamforming
with artificial noise for multi-antenna channels, and other
signaling designs for relay channels or cognitive radio sys-
tems. In addition, the recent results on secrecy in large-
scale decentralized wireless networks were reviewed. Future
research directions on physical layer security with imperfect
CSI include the imperfect channel estimation at receiver sides
and the imperfect knowledge of the eavesdropper’s location.
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